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CORPORATE FARMING: HOW INTERPRETATION OF THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE IS MAKING RESTRICTIONS MORE
DIFFICULT
Jones v. Gale'
I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1970s, many states, like Nebraska, became concerned about
the negative effects on rural societies associated with non-family farming
corporations. 2 Nebraska decided that restrictions on corporate ownership
of family farms were necessary to safeguard the landscape of rural
Nebraska and to promote the continued existence of independent family
farms.3 In 1982, Initiative 300 ("1-300") was put before the voters of
Nebraska and passed.4 1-300 prohibited corporations from owning farm
land in Nebraska with the exception of family-owned farms in which the
majority shareholder either lived on the land or actively participated in the
day-to-day management of the farm.
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Jones v. Gale declared 1-300 to be
unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause. 6 In route to this
determination, the court applied a two-tiered analysis that first considered
whether 1-300 was discriminatory. 7 Because 1-300 only allows people who
live on their farms in Nebraska or who are able to conduct daily operations
on the farm to qualify for the exemption to corporate ownership, it is clear
that 1-300 does discriminate against out-of-state Nebraska land owners and

1Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 2006).
2 Friends of the Constitution, Initiative 300 Rationale,www.i200.org/rationale.htm.
3

Id. Nebraska's landscape, from the beginning, had been shaped by the independent
family farm. Id. Nebraska farmers were concerned that corporately owned farms would
continue to concentrate ownership of farm land into fewer and fewer units because of the
increased borrowing potential created by limited liability and lower tax rates. Id.
4 Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 2006).
5
Id. This exemption accomplishes the goal of having a large number of independent
family farms, but still allows farmers to take advantage of the tax incentives and increase
capital that comes with the corporate designation.
6
Id. at 1270.
7id
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the heightened scrutiny that the court applied was appropriate. 8 However,
in the second part of the analysis, the court's discussion of Nebraska's
legitimate local interests is superficial at best.9 In its discussion of whether
there was any other means to advance a legitimate local interest, the court
does not discuss any factual findings presented by the proponents of I300.10 The lack of discussion is disturbing because there were numerous
studies done on the adverse environmental impacts as well as adverse
social and economic impacts of large scale corporate farming." This case
note asserts that when a law is challenged under the dormant commerce
clause, (1) the severity of the discrimination should be proportional to the
justification needed to support the discriminatory law, or (2) at a
minimum, the interests and studies in support of 1-300 deserved wellreasoned consideration instead of a conclusory finding of
unconstitutionality.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

In this case, a group of six Nebraska land owners filed an action
against the Secretary of State and the Attorney General for the state of
Nebraska in their official capacities.1 2 The plaintiffs brought this suit to
challenge 1-300, the amendment to the Nebraska Constitution passed in
1982. " 1-300 prohibited corporations or non-family-owned limited
partnerships from buying Nebraska land used for farming or ranching or
from participating in the practice of farming or ranching within the state of
Nebraska.14 The plaintiffs asserted that 1-300 violated the commerce
Id. at 1269.
Id. The court does not seem to want to delve into the issue of the negative effects on
rural Nebraska. Id. Instead, the court just says that it does not know what this means and
that a desire to maintain the status quo cannot be a legitimate local interest. Id.
10 1Id.
" Friends of the Constitution, www.i300.org/factsheets.htm.
'2 Id at 1264.
9

13

id.

14 Id. Initiative 300 appeared on the ballot in the 1982 general election and was

accompanied with a title prepared by the Attorney general that read as follows: "Shall a
constitutional prohibition be created prohibiting ownership of Nebraska farm or ranch
land by any corporation, domestic or foreign, which is not a Nebraska family farm
corporation .. . ?" Neb. Stat. § 32-1410(1).
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clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution.'s They also asserted that the
amendment violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").16
Family farms or ranch corporations are specifically exempted from
coverage of 1-300, which plaintiffs argued was an unconstitutional burden
on out-of-state interests under the commerce clause.' 7
The plaintiffs' claims in this case are representative of the
situations of two plaintiffs in particular. One of the plaintiffs, Terrance
Schumacher, resides in Boulder, Colorado and owns interests in farmland
in five counties in Nebraska.' 8 Schumacher wanted to be able to transfer
his farmland to a limited liability entity in order to improve fiscal
planning, operational management of the farmland, and to provide more
favorable options for estate planning.19 Because Schumacher did not
qualify for the family farm exemption of 1-300, Nebraska law would not
allow him to form a limited liability farm corporation. 20 Schumacher
claimed that he suffered large economic losses as a result of the preclusion
from forming a family farm corporation. 2 1
1s Id. The court ultimately determined that it would not make a decision on the ADA
claim unless the plaintiffs at a future time wished to recover attorney's fees that could
only be recovered under a successful assertion of the ADA claim. Id. at 1271.
6 Id. at 1265. Initiative 300 was adopted as a part of the Nebraska state
constitution in
1982. See Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8.
17
Id. The act defines a family farm or ranch corporation as "a corporation engaged in
farming or ranching or the ownership of agricultural land, in which the majority of the
voting stock is held by members of a family... at least one of whom is a person residing
on or actively engaged in the day to day labor and management of the farm or ranch."
Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8.
8
Id. at 1266. Schumacher does not qualify for the family farm corporation exemption
for two reasons. Id First, neither he nor any of his relatives live on any of his farmland
in Nebraska. Second, he lives far enough away that it is not possible for him to perform
the day-to-day labor or management of the farm. Id.
19
Id.
20id

21Id.

Without the ability to form a corporation farmers suffer reduced fiscal and
operational management efficiencies, reduced marketing opportunities, and have much
less borrowing power. Id. Farmers such as Schumacher also experience higher
administrative expenses than those that have formed corporations and higher federal
estate taxes. Id. These farmers are also exposed to more personal liability than farmers
who are allowed to form corporations. Id. These personal liabilities include "liability for
debts, obligations, contracts, and torts related to [their] Nebraska farmland." Id.
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A second plaintiff, Robert Beck III, is a resident of rural Kearney,
Nebraska.22 Beck owns a cattle feedlot and many of the cattle that his
feedlot houses are owned by non-Nebraska residents.2 3 Beck claimed that
1-300 prevented him from contracting with non-exempt out-of-state
corporations in connection with his cattle feeding business. 24 1-300
prevented Beck from selling interest in his cattle operation to non-exempt
entities which made it much more difficult for him to gain access to the
working capital necessary to run his business. 25 Beck did not claim,
however, that he attempted to enter into any actual contracts with nonexempt out of state entities. 2 6 Instead, he claimed that if he were to enter
into any contract with a non-exempt out-of-state entity, 1-300 would
prevent such an action, and his inability to enter into such contracts caused
him economic harm.2 7
Prior to trial, all parties submitted motions for summary
judgment.2 8 The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs
on their claim that 1-300 violated the United States Constitution. 29 The
court reasoned that summary judgment was appropriate for the plaintiffs
because 1-300 violated both the ADA and the Commerce Clause. 30 The
district court, however, granted summary judgment to the defendants on
the claims that 1-300 violated the equal protection clause and the
privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution. 31 The
22 id

23
24

d
Id. This inability to contract with out-of-state corporations has caused
Beck to lose
business, income, and borrowing power. Id. Beck claims that he wants to be able to
enter into the national cattle market, but Initiative 300 has placed restrictions on his
business that have made this difficult to accomplish. Id.
25
Id. Additionally, Initiative 300 precludes farmers such as Beck from gradually
transferring ownership of their farmland to employees that work on the farm. Id. Beck
claims that this part of the law prohibits him from creating the succession plan that he
desires for his farm. Id.
26id

" Id.
Id. at 1264.

28
29

d

30 i

Id. The fact that the state won summary judgment on the questions of equal
protection
and privileges and immunities does not offer much help. It indicates only that those
questions were not proper on the instant appeal. Even though the District court found for
31
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state officials initiated the appeal to the Eighth Circuit and contended that
at the very least summary judgment was inapproPriate on the
constitutional issues of the commerce clause and the ADA.
The Defendants in this case first claimed that the court lacked
jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' lacked Article III standing to assert
their claims. 3 3 The court looked at plaintiffs Schumacher and Beck and
determined that because they suffered a concrete and particularized harm
that is actual in nature and that can be redressed by the court, the plaintiffs
met the requirements of Article III.3 4 Because these two plaintiffs met the
necessary Article III standing requirements, the court held that it did have
jurisdiction over the case. 35
The Eighth Circuit then analyzed whether 1-300 violated the
dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 3 6 The
defendant state officials argued that 1-300 is not facially discriminatory
because it does not prohibit out-of-state residents from owning land in
Nebraska and it in fact excludes many in-state corporations as well as outof-state corporations. 3 7 The court found that 1-300 was facially
discriminatory and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.3 8 Even though the
determination of facial discrimination made further determination
unnecessary, the Court also determined that 1-300 was drafted with
discriminatory intent. 39 The court then held that 1-300 does not meet the

the state on two issues of constitutionality the law was still determined to be
unconstitutional so it is still struck down.
32

" Id. at 1265. The issue of standing is reviewed de novo on appeal, and as long as one
has sufficient standing then the court can hear the case. Id.
plaintiff
4
3 Id. at 1265-67.
3s Id. at 1267.
36 id

Id. The defendants are arguing that if the law is not facially discriminatory that a
challenge under the commerce clause cannot be successful. Id. The court flatly rejects
this and says that discriminatory impact is enough by itself to sustain a challenge under
the commerce clause. Id.
3

38Id.

Id. at 1267-70. The court notes that either discriminatory intent or facial discrimination
would be sufficient to invoke strict scrutiny. Id at 1270.
3
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test of strict scrutiny and is therefore unconstitutional as a violation of the
dormant commerce clause. 40
Next, the defendant state officials argued that 1-300 should not be
struck down in whole, but rather that it should be broken up and allowed
to remain in part. 4 1 The plaintiffs contended that if the law was not struck
down as a whole that there would be no workable plan and that the other
valid portions would not be independently enforceable. 42 The court held
that because the overall goal of the law would be frustrated by repealing
only part of 1-300, the law should be struck down as a whole. 43
Finally, the Eighth Circuit determined that because 1-300 was
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the dormant commerce
clause, there was no reason to determine whether it also violated the
ADA." The court did note, however, that it may become necessary in the
future to determine the validity of the ADA claim. 4 5 The court noted that
if the plaintiffs move for and are awarded attorney's fees in the district
court, which are only awardable under the ADA claim and not the
constitutional claim, the court would, at that time, review the validity of
the ADA claim.46
The Eighth Circuit held that because 1-300 discriminates against
non-residents of Nebraska on its face and because the "legitimate local
interests" asserted by Nebraska for such discrimination could be
accomplished by non-discriminatory means, 1-300 violated the dormant
commerce clause and therefore 1-300 was struck down as
unconstitutional.4 7

40

Id. In order to meet the test set forth by the court the defendants would
have had to
show that "Nebraska could not advance a legitimate local interest without discriminating
against non-resident farm corporations and limited partnerships." Id.
41

Id. at 1270-71.

42

Id. at 1271.

43 Id. The court alludes to the fact that the voters who passed the initiative were induced

to vote for the initiative by the very provisions that were found to be unconstitutional and
therefore it would not make sense to keep the rest of the law. Id.
4 Id.
45 id
4

Id.

47 Id. at 1270.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

In 1972, following the lead of several other Midwestern states,
several bills were introduced in the Nebraska legislature to place limits on
corporate owned farmland and livestock within the state of Nebraska.4 8
However, the original bills all failed because the state's Attorney General
believed that the proposed bills were unconstitutional under the Nebraska
Constitution. 49 In 1982, an amendment to the Nebraska Constitution ("I300") was put before the voters.50 The initiative was passed by the voters
of Nebraska by a margin of 56% to 44%, and it purported to ban all
corporations and syndicates from owning farmland in Nebraska unless
they qualified under a family-farm exemption provided in I-300.51
The first court case challenging 1-300 was heard in the Nebraska
state courts in 1986.52 In that case, the Nebraska Supreme Court first
determined that because 1-300 was an amendment to the Nebraska
Constitution and not a statute, it could not be held unconstitutional under
the Nebraska Constitution.53 The Nebraska Supreme Court then held that
because 1-300 does not discriminate based on a protected class, but instead
was merely economic legislation, the challenge under the Equal Protection
http://www.i300.org/history.htm. Similar bills were adopted in seven other
Midwestern states such as Missouri, Kansas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South
Dakota and Iowa. Id.; see Mo. REv. STAT. § 350.010 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 175901 (repealed); MINN. STAT. § 500.24 (2004); WIsc. STAT. § 182.001; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 10-06.1-02; S.D. CONST. ART XVII § 21-24 (held unconstitutional); IOWA CODE
9H).
4ch.
9
48

id

50

Id The signatures required for the initiative were collected by a coalition of farm and
church groups that had been battling the Nebraska legislature and Attorney General for
10 years. Id. Opponents of the initiative argued that it would drive down land prices and
push cattle operations out of the state. Id The law passed primarily on the strength of
the rural counties in the state. Id.
s Id. Exemptions allowed small family owned farm operations to be classified as
corporations, but the exemption was limited to in-state owners. Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d
1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 2006). After the initiative was adopted by the voters, the Nebraska
legislature then repealed the Corporate Reporting Act so that violators of the amendment
could not be identified. http://www.i300.org/history.htm. The Nebraska legislature has
also considered numerous bills to repeal or change the law, but all such attempts failed
primarily because of the opposition from the citizens of Nebraska. Id.
52 See Omaha National Bank v. Robert Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. 1986).
" Id. at 222.
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Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution would
receive rational basis review. 54 Rational basis review is a very low
standard which only requires the state to prove that the law is "rationally
related to a legitimate state interest," and the court easily found such a
rationally related legitimate interest in this case.ss
A Nebraska bank corporation brought a second case in federal
district court in Nebraska, again challenging 1-300 on the basis that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 56 The District court held that 1-300
was constitutional, and the case was appealed to the Eighth Circuit.17 The
Eighth Circuit first determined that 1-300's classification scheme did not
involve a fundamental right or a suspect classification, and therefore as
long as the state could show that 1-300 was rationally related to a
legitimate state interest the law would be upheld. The Eighth Circuit
noted the importance of this case by stating that eight other Midwestern
states have laws similar to 1-300, including Missouri, Iowa, and Kansas. 59
The plaintiffs contended that the law was not rationally related to the
state's purpose of preserving the family farm because the exemptions in
the law could result in a higher percentage of corporate farms than family
owned farms. 60 The Eighth Circuit held that the state did not have to show
that 1-300 would actually work to achieve the state interest; it was instead
enough that there was a tendency for the law to accomplish the goal.6 1
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit upheld 1-300 as valid under the Equal
54

id
Id at 230-31. The court said that when economic legislation is challenged under equal
protection that it would almost always defer to the findings of the legislature in passing
the law. Id. The court did not specifically point to a particular legitimate state interest,
but under the low threshold of rational basis review the Nebraska Supreme Court
determined that 1-300 was constitutional on the grounds of Equal Protection. Id at 232.
56 MSM Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330, 331 (8th Cir.
1991).
57
id
s Id. at 332.
5s

59id

60

Id at 333.
Id. at 334. The plaintiffs also attempted to raise a due process challenge
to 1-300
because the law requires a corporation who acquires Nebraska land in violation of 1-300
to divest the land within two years after the state acquires a court order requiring
divestment. Id. The Eighth Circuit refused to pass on the issue because it was not
properly raised first before the district court. Id.
61
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Protection Clause. 62
Two other cases were brought in the Nebraska state courts in
which the interpretation and enforcement of 1-300 was questioned. 63 In
1997, the Nebraska Supreme Court heard a case in which the plaintiff
attem ted to assert that its hog operation fell within the exception to I300. The plaintiff claimed that because the non-stock cooperative was a
non-profit corporation, it should be allowed to exist under the exemption
to I-300.65 The Nebraska Supreme Court looked at the language of 1-300
and the amendment as it was presented to the voters of Nebraska and
determined, "[t]he voters have placed in their Constitution words which
forbid a corporation to obtain, in any way, any kind of interest ('legal,
beneficial, or otherwise') in certain real estate. It is clear that any interest
obtained by a corporation must be something."66 One additional case was
filed by citizens of Nebraska to force the Attorney General of Nebraska to
enforce the provisions of I-300.67 There the court held that because the
county attorney possessed knowledge that the defendant Progress Pig was
in violation of the exemption to 1-300, in that the majority shareholder did
not live on the land, a suit for an injunction by the citizens of Nebraska
was proper.6 8 On remand to the trial court, the court found that Progress

62id

63

http://www.i300.org/history.htm.

6 Pig Pro Nonstock Cooperative v. Moore, 253 Neb. 72, 74 (Neb. 1997).
65 Id. The Nebraska Supreme court agreed that the non-stock cooperative was a nonprofit corporation, but the corporation existed for the profit of its members and therefore
did not fit within the exemption of 1-300. Id.
66
Id. at 84. This interpretation makes clear that the effect of 1-300 is very real. Id. The
decision limits the people who can qualify for the exemption under 1-300 to a small class
of people who live on their land in Nebraska. Id.
67 Hall v. Progress Pig, 254 Neb. 150, 152 (Neb. 1998). The citizens in this action were
trying to get an injunction against a pig operation that the citizens felt was in violation of
1-300. Id The court granted the citizens standing to seek the injunction because the
Attorney General had failed to do so. Id.
68
Id. at 160. This basically sets the stage for future litigation in that there will be no
doubt that the eminency requirement of standing could easily be met for any future
Constitutional challenges. Even if the state failed to enforce 1-300, the citizens could do
it themselves.
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Pig was in violation of 1-300, and therefore could not be a corporate owner
of the Nebraska farmland.6 9
In the mid 1990's, the Nebraska legislature dealt with other
questions about 1-300 through the enactment of new statutes. 70 First, the
legislature addressed the question of whether limited liability companies
and partnerships would be considered syndicates for purposes of I-300.n
The new legislation spelled out in clear language that only family-owned
limited liability partnerships and companies could own farmland in
Nebraska. 72 In 1998, the Nebraska legislature passed a law that would
require corporations to report their activities to the state. 73
The Jones v. Gale case came to the federal courts in Nebraska with
this litigation over 1-300 looming in the past. The plaintiffs in this case,
however, attempted a new approach to challenging 1-300. Because
challenges under the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment had
failed, the plaintiffs attempted to prove that 1-300 violated the dormant
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. With this strategy they
hoped to force the court to look at 1-300 through the lens of strict scrutiny
rather than the easily met rational basis test.
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants the
United States Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce.7 4
The dormant commerce clause is the negative implication raised by the
commerce clause that "states may not enact laws that discriminate against
or unduly burden interstate commerce."7 In order to determine if a state
http://www.i300.org/history.htm. The Nebraska Supreme Court agreed with
the trial
court's decision on subsequent appeal and stated "to be actively engaged in the day-today labor and management of the farm or ranch requires that [a] person be involved on a
daily or routine basis in all aspects of the farm ... activities, be it labor or management."
Id
70
69

id

"' Id
72

1d. This additional language provided by the legislature probably was not necessary as
it was thought that the term syndicates was sufficient to cover such entities, but the
Nebraska legislature wanted to make sure that this was the case. Id.
" Id. The 1998 bill LB 1163 required all limited liability entities to report their
ownership of Nebraska farmland to the state, and it gave the Secretary of State and
Attorney General the power to enforce the reporting law and 1-300. Id.
74
Id. at 592 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
75
Id. (citing Quill Corp v. N.D., 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992)). By recognizing the dormant
Commerce Clause the courts have recognized "the Framers' purpose to 'preven[t] a State
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law violates the dormant commerce clause, the first question is "whether
the challenged law discriminates against interstate commerce." 76 If the
law is found to be discriminatory, the presumption is that the law is invalid
unless the proponents of the law "can demonstrate under rigorous scrutiny,
that [they have] no other means to advance a legitimate local interest."77 if
the law is found to be non-discriminatory, the law will be upheld unless
"the burden it imposes on interstate commerce 'is clearly excessive in
relation to its putative local benefits."' 78
In order to analyze the question of whether or not the law is
discriminatory, the Supreme Court has set forth three indicators of
discrimination against out-of-state interest. 9 The first indicator is
evidence in the record that would support a finding that the law has a
discriminatory purpose.8 0 Second, the law could discriminate on its face
against out-of-state interests. Finally, even if the law does not have a
discriminatory purpose and it is not facially discriminatory, it could have a
discriminatory effect. 82 A plaintiff may assert that a given statute is
discriminatory for all of the foregoing reasons, but the court only has to
from retreating into economic isolation or jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a
whole, as it would do if it were free to place burdens on the flow of commerce across its
borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear."' Id at 593 (other
citations omitted).
76 Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1267 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). The type of discrimination that
scrutinized here is "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests
that benefits the former and burdens the latter." Id.
n S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 593 (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v
Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994)).
7 Id. (quoting Pike v Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
so Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984). In Bacchus Imports, the
Hawaii legislature had enacted a statute that exempted locally grown wines from the
alcohol tax. Id. The Hawaii legislature stated that its reason for creating the exemption
was to help the local wine industry. Id. The Supreme Court said that it would take this
finding by the legislature at face value and the law therefore had a discriminatory
urpose. Id. at 271.
51
Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992). In Hunt the state of Alabama
had enacted a law that charged more to dispose of chemicals that came in from out of
state. Id. The Supreme Court said that this charge of a higher tariff was constituted
facial discrimination in violation of the Commerce Clause. Id.
82 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 n. 19 (1986).

485

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 14, No. 3
find that the law is discriminatory for one of the reasons in order to invoke
the strict scrutiny standard.
The burden of proving that the law has a discriminatory purpose or
effect is on the plaintiff. 84 One of the best and most obvious sources of
evidence of a discriminatory purpose are often found in the notes of the
drafters of the law that accompany it, or discriminatory statements that
accompany the law when it is presented to voters.85 If the plaintiff meets
his burden of showing that the law is discriminatory then the burden shifts
to the defendant to show that they have no other means to promote their
legitimate local interest. 86 The standard to determine when there is no
alternative means to achieve the legitimate local interest is one of strict
scrutiny in which the law is deemed to be per se invalid unless the
proponents of the law can prove otherwise. 87 In order to find a legitimate
local interest, the discrimination found in the statute must be justified by a
"valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism," or in other words there
must be a non-economic justification for the discrimination.8 8 Even
though there is presumption of invalidity with a law that is found to be
discriminatory, the court must consider "the overall effect of the statute on
both local and interstate activity." 89 The Eighth Circuit previously

S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 593.
8 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
81 Hazeltine, 340 F.3d
at 593.
86 C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y.,
511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994). In Carbone,
the town of Clarkstown was trying to assert that they had a legitimate local interest in
regulating the flow of trash that entered into their landfill facility. Id. at 392-393. The
court rejected this because the town had any number of nondiscriminatory alternatives
that would address the legitimate local interest. Id. at 393.
87 Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1270
(8th Cir. 2006).
88 New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274
(1988). In Limbach, the
state of Ohio created a tax break for producers of ethanol inside the state, and out of state
producers that operated in states that gave tax breaks to the Ohio producers. Id. Ohio
advanced the legitimate local interests of health and increased use of ethanol in support of
the statute. Id. at 279. The Supreme Court said that any health affects that were achieved
were only incidental to the real purpose of providing tax benefits to Ohio companies, and
that the increase use argument was merely speculative. Id.
89 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 402 (1994) (quoting
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986)).
83
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determined that promoting family farms is a legitimate state interest. 9 0
Much more burdensome than a finding of a legitimate local interest,
however, is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that there is no nondiscriminatory alternative to accomplish the legitimate local interest.9 1
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In Jones v. Gale, the Eighth Circuit first addressed the threshold
question of the plaintiffs standing to bring suit. 92 In making the standing
determination, the court had to determine if Plaintiff Schumacher had
suffered an injury in fact as required by Article III standing. The Eighth
Circuit held that because Schumacher could realistically be prevented
from creating a corporation because of where he lived, he had suffered an
injury in fact. Thus, he had standing to challenge I-300.94 Even though the
90 S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 596 (citing MSM Farms, Ind. v. Spire,

927 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1991). In Hazeltine, the Eighth Circuit says that the
promotion of the family farm and the protection of the environment are legitimate local
interests under the commerce clause. Id Even though the court found a legitimate local
interest, the defendants had to the show that there was no non-discriminatory way to
advance that interest. Id.
9'Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 597. The court in Hazeltine says that the defendant is in the best
position to provide economic and environmental forecasts for the effectiveness of
possible non-discriminatory alternatives. Id. The court in Hazeltine even went so far as
to say that the defendant has the burden of coming up with these alternative as well as
explaining why they will not work. Id In this case the defendant apparently denied the
existence of any alternative and none were specifically provided by the plaintiff, but yet
the court searched the record and found four alternatives that it felt were nondiscriminatory and would promote the legitimate local interest. Id. Ultimately the court
struck down the South Dakota law, which is similar to 1-300, because the proponents of
the law did not show that other non-discriminatory alternatives would not advance the
legitimate local interest. Id.
92 Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 2006). The state officials claimed the
district court should not have even reached the plaintiffs commerce clause claim because
the plaintiffs lacked standing. Id.
93
Id. The State Officials argued that a correct interpretation of 1-300 does not require the
main shareholder of the farm to live on the farm or manage the day-to-day activities of
the farm. Id. at 1268.
94
Id. at 1266. The court determines that the standing issue really goes to the substance of
the claim and should not be discussed as a preliminary issue to preclude jurisdiction in
this case. Id.
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standing requirement is only necessary for one plaintiff, the court went on
to address the standing of another plaintiff.95 The state officials claimed
that Plaintiff Beck did not have standing because his farm had been
incorporated under 1-300 and he did not have any actual contracts with out
of state corporations. 96 The Eighth Circuit held that because Plaintiff Beck
had demonstrated that he had suffered a negative effect on his business, in
that he was unable to contract with non-exempt entities or risk losing his
own exempt status, Beck had standing to challenge I-300.97
After the court's initial holding that the plaintiffs had standing, the
Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether 1-300 violates the dormant
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 98 The first question in
the commerce clause analysis is whether the law is discriminatory in any
one of three ways: on its face, through its purpose, or through its effect. 99
In order to make a determination on the issue of whether or not 1-300 is
facially discriminatory, the court had to interpret the language of the
amendment. 0o The Eighth Circuit focused on the plain meaning of the
language of 1-300, in which the most natural and obvious meaning of the
words were considered in its analysis of whether 1-300 is facially
discriminatory.o10 The court found that the language of the exemption to I300 allowed corporate ownership for people who lived in Nebraska or in
close proximity thereof to be able to conduct the daily operations of the
farm.1 2 The court held that because 1-300 clearly discriminates against
Nebraska landowners that reside outside of the state, I-300 was
discriminatory on its face.1 03
95

Id. Plaintiff Beck is a Nebraska resident and actually owns a farm that qualifies for the
exemption,
which allows it to be classified as a corporation. Id.
96
Id. Beck claims that because 1-300 does not allow him to contract with non-exempt
out-of-state corporate entities, he has lost business, income, and borrowing power. Id
9 Id. at 1267. These two plaintiffs demonstrate that not only are out of state land owners
affected by the terms of 1-300, but also people who qualify for the exemption and actually
incorporate their farms are strongly affected by the real possibility that they will lose their
exemption if they contract with non-exempt entities. Id.
98
id.
9 Id.
'" Id. at 1268.
'0 Id. at 1269.
102
03

id
Id. This holding was based on the premise that when interpreting statutes that the
court should first look to the plain meaning of the statute's language. Id
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The state officials argued that the exemption to 1-300 did not
require the majority shareholder to live on or perform a majority of the
daily activities on the Nebraska farm.104 Instead, the state officials
asserted that in order to qualify, the majority shareholder just had to
operate or live on a family farm in any state. 105 The state officials gave the
example that a family farm owner that lived and worked on his farm in
Colorado and that also owned land in Nebraska could incorporate his
Nebraska farm under the exemption in 1-300.106 The state officials further
asserted that given two possible interpretations, the court should prefer the
interpretation that avoided a constitutional conflict.' 0 7 The court rejected
these arguments by the state officials because the language of the
exemption talks only about land in the state of Nebraska and refers only to
farms in the state of Nebraska, but the exemption does not mention
anything about the possibility of out of state ownership. 0 8 The court also
rejected this argument because it would have been contrary to the
Nebraska Supreme Court's interpretation of the amendment as well as
contrary to the purpose of the Initiative as it was presented to the voters.' 0 9
Even though the affirmative holding of facial discrimination made
determining the amendment's discriminatory intent unnecessary, the
Eighth Circuit considered the alternative reason for finding 1-300 to be
discriminatory."l 0 The court considered the wording of 1-300 as well as
other evidence such as statements by the legislature and material presented
to the voters that resulted in passage of the amendment."' The court first
cited a ballot title to 1-300 that accompanied the initiative that told voters
'MId. at 1268.

105 Id.
106 id.
07
1

Id

1os Id. This could be one possible way for states to get around the commerce clause
problem without giving up all of the benefits of the law. In other words, by allowing
people to qualify for the exemption no matter where the farm they live or work on is
located, the states could avoid the problem of discrimination under the commerce clause.
'0Id.at 1269.
noId.
'1 Id. The Nebraska Supreme court previously held that they would only look to the
words of the amendment itself in determining if there is a discriminatory purpose to the
amendment. Id. The Eighth Circuit explicitly states that it is not bound by this decision
and would consider other sources of discriminatory intent, consistent with prior Eighth
Circuit precedent. Id.
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that 1-300 would "prohibit[ ] ownership of Nebraska farm or ranch land by
any corporation, domestic or foreign, which is not a Nebraska family farm
corporation."ll2 The court also referred to a television advertisement that
was presented to voters to encourage the adoption of 1-300 which stated:
"Let's send a message to those rich out-of-state corporations. Our land's
not for sale, and neither is our vote. Vote for Initiative 300."' 13 The Eighth
Circuit held that because television advertisements and other propaganda
presented to voters in support of 1-300 clearly demonstrated a
discriminatory intent, 1-300 is discriminatory in intent as well as on its

face.114
Because 1-300 was deemed discriminatory, the Eighth Circuit
considered it to be "per se invalid unless [the state] can demonstrate,
under rigorous scrutiny, that [it has] no other means to advance a
legitimate local interest."' 1 5 The State Officials put forth three examples
of what they claimed to be legitimate local interests in support of 1-300.H6
The State Officials contended that unrestricted corporate ownership of
Nebraska farmland would result in (1) "absentee owners of land, (2)
negative effects on the social and economic culture of rural Nebraska, and
(3) a lack of good stewardship of the state's land, water, and natural
resources." 117 The court first noted that under the State Official's
interpretation of 1-300 that the amendment would not even work to
prevent absentee ownership of Nebraska land, therefore this could not be a
legitimate local interest sufficient to overcome the presumption of
unconstitutionality.
Despite the contradictory interpretation by the State
Officials, the court said that all three legitimate reasons were insufficient
because the defendants failed to give any reason why environmental and
1 12 id.

Id. at 1270.
14 Id. at 1269-70.
us Id. at 1270 (quoting S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 593; C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994)) (internal quotes
omitted).
116 id
117 id
" 8 Id. The State Officials have supported an interpretation of 1-300 that would not
require the majority shareholder to live on the farm or perform daily activities on the
farm. Id. The court is basically saying that the defendants must go with one
interpretation without really giving a reason why they cannot argue in the alternative. Id.
"
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land use regulations could not be used to accomplish the same goals.119
The court noted that the interests asserted by the State Officials were not
concrete enough to allow the court to come up with its own alternatives,
but the court pointed out that if the interests were more clearly stated they
could better discern whether the state's interests could be met by other
regulations.120 The Eighth Circuit held that because the State Officials
failed to demonstrate that they could not meet their legitimate local
interest by other means, 1-300 violated the dormant commerce clause.'21
The final issue decided by the Eighth Circuit was whether 1-300
was unconstitutional in its entirety or whether only the discriminatory
sections of 1-300 are unconstitutional and severable from the valid
portions.122 The court stated that by severing the invalid portions of 1-300
there would still be a valid plan that is independently enforceable.123
However, the voter's intent would likely be violated by severing the
portions of 1-300 that were discriminatory. 124 The Eighth Circuit held that
because eliminating the unconstitutional section would completely disrupt
the original intent of 1-300, the entire amendment was unconstitutional. 125
V. COMMENT
Because eight states other than Nebraska restrict corporate
ownership of farm land,126 it is imperative that the Eighth Circuit's
"9

Id. Under this strict scrutiny test the burden in on the state to come up with reasons
why this discriminatory law is the only way to advance the legitimate local interest. Id
Basically, once the plaintiff has shown that the law is discriminatory the burden shifts to
the defendant as the proponent of the presumptively invalid law. Id.
120

id

121

id

122

Id. The court states that the statute is severable if there is still a "workable plan" after
severance, the parts not severed are independently enforceable, the invalid parts were not
the only reason the law was, and the intent of the legislature will not be violated through
severance. Id. at 1271.
123id

Id. This includes the day-to-day management and residency provisions of the family
farm
exception. Id.
125 id.
126 Friends of the Constitution, A History of Initiative 300, www.i300.org/history/htm.
The states that have introduced similar anti-corporate fanning legislation include Kansas,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, South Dakota, Iowa, North Dakota, and Missouri. Id.
124
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decision to strike down 1-300 under the commerce clause be closely
scrutinized. There are two parts to the court's analysis under the
commerce clause.127 The first determination in the analysis is whether or
not the law is discriminatory.1 28 In Jones v. Gale, the court's ultimate
finding that the law is discriminatory, and subject to heightened scrutiny,
is inevitable based on the language of 1-300 and the propaganda that
supported its passage.129 In the second part of the analysis, the court
applies strict scrutiny to determine if there is any other way to accomplish
the legitimate local interest.130 The court should attempt to make a
distinction between protectionist discrimination that seeks to cut the state
off from the rest of the country and lesser forms of discrimination. Even if
the state cannot show that there is no other reasonable non-discriminatory
means to accomplish the legitimate interest, the court must sufficiently
discuss every justification put forth by the state in order to give guidance
to subsequent defendants that face challenges to laws similar to 1-300.
Finally, this comment provides an analysis of the Missouri Corporate
farming statute and suggestions for how the proponents of the law might
overcome commerce clause challenges.
In Jones v. Gale, the Eighth Circuit concentrated on the
determination of whether or not 1-300 was discriminatory either facially or
through its purpose.' 3 ' The court's discussion of that issue was well
thought out and very clear.132 The court discussed a possible interpretation
of the statute, advanced by the state officials, which would not have been
discriminatory.133 However, in common sense fashion, the court found
that the state's interpretation just simply could not be supported by the
127

Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1267-70 (8th Cir. 2006).

128 id.

19

Id. at 1269-70.

130d. at 1267-70.
131 id
132

Id. The state argued that 1-300 did not require the majority shareholder to live or
work
on the farm in order to qualify for the corporate exemption. Id. at 1268. The court
supports this interpretation from the fact that the ballot proposal "stated that the
amendment's purpose was to prohibit further purchases of agricultural land 'by any
corporation .. . other than . . . a Nebraska family farm corporation."' Id.
133 Id. The court even takes the time to go through an entire analysis for discriminatory
purpose even though it has given a completely rational explanation that 1-300 is
discriminatory on its face. Id. at 1269.
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language of the statute or the propaganda that accompanied the initiative
as presented to the voters.
Once the court closely examined the
statutory language and the purpose of the amendment as presented to the
voters, the only possible outcome was to find that 1-300 did discriminate
against out-of-state interests.13 5
The court's holding on the issue of discrimination was, ultimately,
determinative of the overall outcome to the suit. This is because a statute
that is non-discriminatory will almost always be upheld, and a statute that
is discriminatory will nearly always be struck down. There are a few
exceptions, but for the most part a statute that burdens out of state interests
more than in-state interests will be struck down as unconstitutional. The
problem with such an all or nothing approach is that the analysis does not
take into account the severity of the discrimination. One court has held
that a less serious form of discrimination should require a lesser
justification for the discrimination.136 This is a form of intermediate
scrutiny for discrimination that is not drastically more burdensome on out
of state activities than in state activities. This intermediate sliding scale
scrutiny is more advantageous because courts would not be forced to
strike down laws that burden out of state activities minimally more than in
state activities. In order to prevent laws that minimally burden out of state
activities from being treated the same as laws that heavily burden out of
state interests, the sliding scale of scrutiny should be adopted by the
Eighth Circuit when laws are challenged under the Commerce Clause. The
Seventh Circuit has found that there is Supreme Court authority indicating
that discrimination under the Commerce Clause should be analyzed the
134
Id.
35
1 id.

Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 1985). In Sestric, a Missouri lawyer
challenged an Illinois law that required practicing attorneys that lived out of state to take
the Illinois bar exam in order to be admitted to the bar, but allowed attorneys that resided
in Illinois to be admitted to the bar without taking the Illinois exam. Id. at 656. The
Seventh Circuit first addressed the claim under the Privileges and Immunities clause and
found the law to be constitutional. Id at 664. The court then goes on to address the
constitutionality of the law under the commerce clause, and it concludes that the analysis
under the commerce clause does not require a more heightened scrutiny analysis than
under the privileges and immunities clause. Id The court goes on to apply the same
standard as it did under the privileges and immunities clause and declares the law to be
constitutional. Id. at 665.
136
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same as discrimination under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.137 in
the majority opinion, Judge Posner extends the sliding scale standard for
analyzing discrimination under the privileges and immunities clause to the
Commerce Clause by the fact that courts cite to the two clauses almost
interchangeably. 138
Despite the difficulty in distinguishing between levels of
discrimination in the context of the Commerce Clause, the policy rationale
of maintaining a unified national economy provides courts with a starting
point to separate levels of discrimination. Most courts seem to be
particularly concerned about laws that attempt to cut the state off from the
rest of the union in a protectionist manner.139 It could be argued that the
discrimination in Jones v. Gale is not highly egregious because out of state
people can qualify for the corporate exemption as long as they perform a
majority of the day to day activities on the farm land and because all nonfamily corporate entities are prohibited from owning farm land.140 If a
court agrees that this type of discrimination only required an intermediate
form of scrutiny, there would be a much better chance of upholding 1-300
or similar laws.
After determining that 1-300 is discriminatory, the court gave a
very short and cursory explanation of why 1-300 does not meet the strict
scrutiny test mandated by a finding that 1-300 is discriminatory.14 1 The
lack of depth to this discussion is presumably due to the fact that once the
law is found to be discriminatory, it is per se invalid unless the law's
proponent meets the burden of establishing that there is a legitimate local
137

Id. at 664. The standard under the privileges and immunities clause is that when
the
discrimination is not serious there is less required to justify that discrimination. Id.
(citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
'38 d. The court recognizes that there is a divergence in the law between the privileges
and immunities clause and the commerce clause, but it goes on to state that when
discrimination falls within either clause courts "cite to decisions under either clause
interchangeably." Id. (citing Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 532-34 (1978)).
'39 Id The court states that the court should examine the "gravity of the interference with
interstate trade" in making a determination of the level of discrimination under the
commerce clause. Id The court also says that laws that are obviously protectionist
should be struck down without much hesitation, but that a law that is apparently
evenhanded should be upheld unless the burden on interstate commerce is clearly greater
than the benefit of the local interest. Id
'4 Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 2006).
141 Id. at
1270.
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interest that cannot be met by any other means. 142 Because the Eighth
Circuit did not fully consider 1-300's effect on agricultural and societal
issues within the state of Nebraska, the court's holding was deficient.143
An in depth discussion of these issues was necessary to make a
determination if there is a non-discriminatory means to accomplish these
benefits of the law, which was the next step in the analysis after finding a
legitimate local interest.'44 Because the court never expressly states
whether or not Nebraska has a legitimate local interest in 1-300, it is not
clear if the discussion of the effects of 1-300 were left out because the
court did not believe there was a legitimate local interest or if there just
was no non-discriminatory way to accomplish these goals.14 5 If the reason
the court did not go into depth about the social and agricultural benefits of
1-300 was the latter, that suggests 1-300 should have been upheld even
under the strictest of scrutiny. Because it is impossible to determine from
the Eighth Circuit opinion whether 1-300 was struck down because the
state failed to assert a legitimate local interest or because the interest could
have been accomplished by non-discriminatory means, the Eighth Circuit
analysis is not complete and should be reviewed. 14 6
Because a number of Midwestern states other than Nebraska have
legislation similar to 1-300, the Eighth Circuit's decision in Jones v. Gale
could greatly affect the rural social landscape of the Midwest. The court
says that it cannot accurately conceptualize the "negative effects on the
social and economic culture of Rural Nebraska." 47 Simply because the
court cannot put its finger on a satisfactory definition for the legitimate
local interest, does not mean that the interest deserves no discussion. The
proponents of 1-300 came forward with numerous studies which conclude
that large scale corporate farming has a significant impact on the social
structure of rural communities. 48 These studies found that in rural
communities without large scale corporate farming compared to
142 id.
143 See

id.

'" Id.
145

d

146

See id.

147

id

148 Brief for Minnesota & Iowa et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8-11,

Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-1308), 2006 WL 1117922.
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communities with such corporate entities incomes were on the average
higher; there were more business enterprises, and they were more
profitable; there were more social amenities such as parks, paved streets,
and sewers; there were more schools, clubs, and churches; and there were
more local newspapers and formal institutions for local political decisionmaking.149 The crucial difference is that in the family farm community,
most of the population was self-employed; in the other, two-thirds were
agricultural workers. 50 These studies show that there is a very real
societal impact that is accomplished by maintaining small family farms
instead of large corporate farms. 5 1 Because the court failed to recognize
this very real impact, its discussion failed to focus on the "no other means"
aspect of scrutiny under the commerce clause.' 52 If the court would have
recognized the very real impact of 1-300 on rural society, it would have
been nearly impossible find that there was a reasonable nondiscriminatory way to accomplish the benefits associated with 1-300.
After Jones v. Gale it is obvious that laws similar to 1-300 in other
Midwestern states, such as Missouri, are susceptible to a Commerce
Clause challenge. It is also important to note that because 1-300 was an
amendment to the Nebraska Constitution, it was not subject to scrutiny
under the Nebraska Constitution. However, the Missouri law that limits
corporate ownership of farm land is statutory and can be challenged under
the state constitution. 153 The fact that the Missouri law is a statute may in
fact turn out to be an advantage because it could be changed by the
Missouri legislature to avoid both Missouri Constitution and Federal
Constitution challenges. The best way that Missouri could insure the
validity of its statute is to make sure that the law is not discriminatory, in
149 id
150
id.
151 See

id.

Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1270 (8th Cir. 2006).
153 See Mo. REv. STAT. § 350.010 (2006). The
Missouri law defines a "family-farm
corporation" that would qualify for the corporate exemptions as "a corporation
incorporated for the purpose of farming and the ownership of agricultural land in which
at least one-half of the voting stock is held by and at least one-half of the stockholders are
members of a family related to each other within the third degree of consanguinity or
affinity including the spouses, sons-in-law and daughters-in-law of any such family
member according to the rules of the common law, and at least one of whose
stockholders is a person residing on or actively operating the farm." Id.
152
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terms of the Commerce Clause, and that it does not burden out of state
interests more than in state interests.
When analyzing the Missouri corporate farming statute in
comparison with 1-300, the two laws are nearly identical in their definition
of the family-farm. One advantage the Missouri law may have over 1-300
and the South Dakota law, struck down on similar grounds, is that the
Missouri law was not presented to the voters of the state. The courts in
both Jones v. Gale and Hazeltine relied heavily upon the language of the
propaganda presented to the voters in determining whether or not the law
was discriminatory.154 The language in this type of propaganda is not the
type of language used in either amendment in the prior cases, but the court
thought that the voters must have had a discriminatory intent when they
voted to pass the amendments.155 In the case of the Missouri corporate
farming law, the court will only be able to look to the intent of the drafters
of the legislation and not propaganda that tends to present a discriminatory
motive.
The definition of a qualifying family-farm in the Missouri law is
also nearly identical to the definition found in the Nebraska law.' 5 6 This is
a problem for Missouri law makers because 1-300 was found to be
discriminatory on its face as well as in its purpose.' 5 7 This means that
even though it will be much more difficult to prove a discriminatory intent
behind the Missouri law, the law could still be struck down as facially
discriminatory. This problem could easily be remedied by the Missouri
legislature by changing the wording of the Missouri law to reflect the
interpretation that the Nebraska state officials argued for in Jones v.
Gale. It might be argued that by changing the qualifications of the
exemption the purpose of the statute would be defeated. It is true that such
a change would alter the effect of the law, but the law would still serve the
purpose of controlling large scale corporate ownership of farm land.

154 See
'55 id.

Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1268. See also Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 594.

15 6 See

NEB. CONST. ART. XII § 8. See also Mo. REV. STAT. § 350.010.
's7 Jones, 470 F.3d 1261, 1269-70.
' Id. at 1268. This formulation would allow people who have a family farm in another
state to perform the daily activities on the farm in that state and still qualify for the
exemption. Id.
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If the Missouri law is challenged before changes can be made to
avoid the finding of facial discrimination, it will be up to the state to
advance a legitimate local interest and to convince the court that there is
no reasonable non-discriminatory way to accomplish the legitimate local
interest. It will not work to assert the legitimate local interest of protecting
the environment because the court will likely conclude that there are
environmental laws or regulations that would accomplish the same
goals.1 59 In Jones, the defendants attempted to assert a new legitimate
local interest of avoiding adverse effects on the rural social landscape.160
The court was unwilling to analyze this legitimate local interest in great
detail because it was very broad and the court felt that the defendants
could have narrowed the definition considerably.161 If this interest could
be more narrowly focused to concentrate on the creation of a two class
rural system created by large scale corporate farming, the court would be
forced to determine whether or not there was a non-discriminatory means
of accomplishing this goal. The proponents of the Missouri law could at
the very least make a cognizable argument that there is no reasonable nondiscriminatory way to accomplish this goal.
VI. CONCLUSION

The controversy with the Jones v. Gale decision is in the
possibility that there could be a ripple effect across other states in the
Midwest to strike down similar laws in other states. The biggest problem
with this decision is that there is insufficient discussion of Nebraska's
legitimate local interest to give any guidance to the other eight states with
similar laws. The court does comment that the decision might be different
if Nebraska had more clearly defined their legitimate local interest, but
there were numerous findings and reports Nebraska and other amicus
curiae submitted that at the very least deserved the court's discussion.
159See S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 597. The court emphasized that

it is the defendant's burden to prove that there are no reasonable non-discriminatory
alternatives to achieve the legitimate local interest. Id. The court in Hazeltine also found
that there were other ways of promoting the legitimate local interest of promoting family
farms. Id.
60
1 Jones, 470 F.3d at 1270.
11id.
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Once the Eighth Circuit found 1-300 to be discriminatory, it was a
foregone conclusion that they would strike down the law. If the court had
taken into account the severity of the discrimination in this case, it would
have been a much closer case of whether or not the justifications for 1-300
were sufficient to overcome this discrimination. Because the effects of
large scale corporate farming could be catastrophic to the social structure
of the rural Midwest, it is imperative that states come up with ways insure
that their corporate farming statutes are not found to be unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause. When other states are faced with a challenge
to their law under the Commerce Clause, they need to do everything they
can to convince the court that their law is not discriminatory. If such a
state is unsuccessful in this argument, it will be imperative that the state
clearly define its legitimate local interest. Hopefully, the Jones v. Gale
decision does not deter the Nebraska legislature from attempting to pass
legislation to restrict corporate farming in the future because the rural
social landscape as it exists in Nebraska today could depend on it.

BROCK H. COOPER
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